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and Participation 
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University of Twente, The Netherlands 
Todd Donovan 
Western Washington University 
Jeffrey A. Karp 
Texas Tech University 
University of Twente, The Netherlands 
According to the minority empowerment thesis, minority representation strengthens representational 
links, fosters more positive attitudes toward government, and encourages political participation. We 
examine this theory from a cross-national perspective, making use of surveys that sampled minori- 
ties in the United States and New Zealand. Both countries incorporate structures into their electoral 
systems that make it possible for minority groups to elect representatives of their choice. We find that 
in both countries descriptive representation matters: it increases knowledge about and contact with 
representatives in the U.S. and leads to more positive evaluations of governmental responsiveness and 
increased electoral participation in New Zealand. These findings have broad implications for debates 
about minority representation. 
Both New Zealand and the United States incorporate structures into their elec- 
toral systems that make it possible for minority groups to elect representatives of 
their choice in single-member districts.' In the United States, this is achieved by 
drawing special majority-minority districts that maximize the number of blacks 
in a congressional district. In New Zealand, seats are set aside exclusively for 
voters of Maori descent. In both countries, there were dramatic increases in 
minority representation in national legislatures in the 1990s (on the U.S. case see 
Endersby and Menifeld 2000, and on the New Zealand case see Karp 2002). 
However, such provisions have not been without controversy. Although the 
experiences of minorities in these countries differ, descriptive representation is 
assumed to be an important aspect of representation in either context. 
1 Other countries such as Belgium, Lebanon, Slovenia, and Zimbabwe also make special provisions 
for ethnic minority representation (see Lijphart 1986). 
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Little, however, is known about what effect representation by a minority leg- 
islator has on the attitudes and behavior of minority voters. We examine this ques- 
tion from a cross-national perspective, making use of survey data from the 1996 
National Black Election Study (NBES) and the 1999 New Zealand Election Study 
(NZES). Examining this question cross-nationally allows us to make generaliza- 
tions on the basis of more observations than would otherwise be the case if the 
analysis were restricted to one country. It also allows us to see if the effect of 
minority empowerment varies by context. 
Electoral Structures and Minority Representation 
The question of how minority representation might affect minority political 
behavior is of particular importance given the controversy over the creation and 
maintenance of districts designed to enhance the descriptive representation of 
underrepresented groups. Because the New Zealand case may be unfamiliar to 
readers, our discussion describes in greater details aspects of Maori representa- 
tion in New Zealand. 
In the United States, the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
and the Supreme Court's Thornburg v. Gingles decision of 1986 facilitated the 
creation of U.S. House districts in which a minority population constitutes a 
majority of the voting-age population (majority-minority districts) so that black 
and Latino candidates could potentially win elected office. After 1986, U.S. 
Justice Department policy encouraged implementation of this logic wherever an 
area contained a large, cohesive minority group (Butler and Cain 1992, 36; Swain 
1993, 197). For the 1990 redistricting, this resulted in practices that substantially 
increased the number of districts where blacks and Latinos comprised a super- 
majority of district voters. The U.S. Supreme Court added complexity to the issue 
in 1993 by stating a lack of tolerance for "bizarre"-shaped districts (Shaw v. Reno) 
that might result from race-based districting and struck down plans where "race 
was the predominant factor motivating the drawing of district lines" (Miller v. 
Johnson; Bush v. Vera; Shaw v. Hunt).2 Despite the continued controversy over 
these districts, they have furthered the representation of blacks (and Latinos) in 
the U.S. Congress. The largest gains in minority representation in the U.S. Con- 
gress occurred in the 1990s after state legislatures drew significant numbers of 
majority-minority district for the 1992 redistricting. 
New Zealand, in contrast, has a much longer tradition of using districting to 
secure minority representation. Since 1867, the country has had a dual con- 
stituency system where representatives to the parliament are elected from two 
sets of single member electorates one for persons of Maori descent and the other 
for those of European descent.3 The contemporary names for these ethnically sep- 
2 It is important to stress that Shaw and associated cases do not overturn the Thornburg v. Gingles 
criteria that are used to establish majority-minority districts. 
3In New Zealand, legislative districts are referred to as electorates. Electorates for those of Euro- 
pean descent were referred to as European electorates and districts for those of Maori descent are 
referred to as Maori electorates. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:15:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
536 Susan A. Banducci, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp 
arate electorates are Maori and general electorates. The boundaries of these dual 
electorates are superimposed on the same geographical space. There are far fewer 
Maori electorates so the area of these electorates is much larger than that of the 
general electorates. 
Creation of the Maori seats was a result of the Europeans' desire to pacify and 
assimilate Maori (Sorrenson 1986) and to accelerate the Europeanization of the 
Maori through their involvement in political affairs and European law (Fleras 
1985). Prior to the passage of the Maori Representation Act in 1867, property 
requirements disqualified most Maori from voting since Maori land was owned 
communally. Foreshadowing concerns about "packing" in the United States, an 
additional motive for establishing separate Maori seats was to ensure a European 
majority in every other seat and limit Maori representation (see Weiner 1998). At 
the time the seats were created, the Maori population was around 50,000, com- 
pared to a European population of 250,000 (Sorrenson 1986, B-2 1). The creation 
of four separate seats reserved for Maori in 1867, instead of the nearly 20 they 
deserved, preempted the formation of a hostile Maori power bloc but also helped 
to maintain their underrepresentation.4 This underrepresentation became even 
more pronounced as the number of European electorates continued to increase 
with population (from 72 in 1867 to 95 in 1993), while the number of Maori elec- 
torates remained fixed for 129 years. Thus, while giving the illusion of demo- 
cratic power sharing, Maori were gerrymandered to the point where they became 
a permanently outvoted minority in a political system designed to suit majority 
interests (Fleras 1985). 
Electoral reform in the 1990s succeeded in furthering Maori representation in 
two important ways. The Electoral Act of 1993 allowed the number of Maori elec- 
torates, which had remained fixed at four, to vary on the basis of enrollment. The 
act provides for the number of Maori seats to rise or fall depending on the number 
of Maori who choose to register on the Maori roll. After each five-year census, 
the drawing of the new electoral boundaries begins with a four-month Maori Elec- 
toral Option during which time those who indicate on their enrollment forms that 
they are of Maori descent are sent letters asking them to choose between regis- 
tering on the Maori or the general electoral roll. Thus, one major difference 
between the Maori electorates and the majority-minority districts in the United 
States is that Maori can choose whether they want separate representation. It is 
estimated that if all Maori were enrolled on the Maori roll, there would be about 
13 Maori electorates (Electoral Commission 2000).5 Since 1993, the percentage 
of Maori choosing to take the Maori roll option has increased steadily, resulting 
4The system of separate electorates also created double standards. For example, the general elec- 
torate received the right to a secret ballot in 1870 but it was not extended to Maori until 1937; reg- 
istration was made compulsory in 1929 for the general electorate but it did not apply to the Maori 
electorates until 1956 (Fleras 1985). 
5 Registration in New Zealand is compulsory. While it is difficult to obtain precise figures on the 
proportion of the electorate that is registered, due to the fact that census data are not broken down 
by voting age population, it is estimated that over 90% of Maori are registered on either roll. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:15:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation 537 
in the creation of an additional Maori seat in each of the three subsequent elec- 
tions.6 As of 2002, almost 170,000 Maori are represented in the seven electorates 
(about 25,000 Maori per electorate). A U.S. Representative, in comparison, rep- 
resents about 25 times more constituents. 
Another significant contribution to the representation of Maori in the 1990s 
was the introduction of proportional representation. In 1996, New Zealand 
held its first election under a new German-style electoral system, referred to as 
miked-member proportional (MMP), that maintains constituency representa- 
tion while ensuring proportional outcomes. About half of the seats in parliament 
are filled by constituency MPs while the other half are filled by MPs who are 
on the party list.7 The commission that recommended the adoption of MMP 
also recommended abolishing the Maori electorates, as proportional representa- 
tion for minority groups was assured via MMP (Royal Commission 1986). 
However, the suggestion met with Maori resistance. Subsequently, Parliament 
disregarded this recommendation and concluded that Maori should decide 
when to abolish the Maori seats (see Weiner 1998). Since the party list deter- 
mines the overall allocation of seats in parliament, parties have an incentive 
to appeal to Maori voters despite the segregation of their constituency votes. 
Such a system enables the minority to have a guaranteed level of descriptive 
representation without risking loss of substantive influence (Nagel 1995). The 
adoption of a proportional party list electoral system together with the dual elec- 
torates has succeeded in increasing Maori representation dramatically. Following 
the first MMP election in 1996 the proportion of Maori in Parliament doubled 
from 6 to 12% (Banducci and Karp 1998).8 In the 1999 election, Maori were able 
to maintain but not improve on their representation, electing a total of 14 Maori 
MPs, with equal numbers elected from the party list and electorate seats (see 
Karp 2002). 
6 In the second Maori Electoral Option round held in 1994, enrollment increased from 41% to 52%, 
resulting in a fifth Maori seat. In comparison, in the previous Maori option held in 1991, there was 
less than a 1% increase among those choosing to register on the Maori roll (personal correspondence 
with Murray Wicks, Electoral Commission Officer, July 3, 2002). In 1997, Maori enrollment 
increased to 54% resulting in a sixth seat, effective in the 1999 election (Electoral Commission 1997, 
128). In 2001, a seventh seat was created following an increase of 4%. 
7 The new MMP system in New Zealand is similar to Germany's electoral system. Voters cast one 
vote for their local MP and another for a party. Parties receiving more than 5% of the vote are rep- 
resented in parliament in proportion to their vote. MMP increased the size of parliament increased 
from 99 to 120. Of the 120 MPs who were elected in the first MMP election in 1996, 65 seats were 
held by MPs elected in single-member constituencies by first-past-the-post (plurality). Five of these 
seats were reserved for Maori. The remaining 55 seats were held by MPs on party lists. 
8 In 1996, about 40% of Maori entering parliament came through the electorates though all of these 
(with the exception of Winston Peters) were elected from the Maori roll. As for the party list, the 
overall number of Maori was evenly distributed across the five major parties, though some parties 
placed Maori more prominently than others, with Labour having the highest proportion of Maori 
elected from their list (Banducci and Karp 1998, 141). 
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Theories of Descriptive Representation and 
Minority Empowerment 
A number of normative theorists have been skeptical of the merits of descrip- 
tive representation relative to other models of representation (e.g., Birch 1971; 
Pitkin 1972; see also Grofman 1982, 97-99). One concern is that there is a 
trade-off between descriptive representation (in the form of a larger number of 
minority members in legislatures) and substantive representation (in the form of 
roll-call votes that advance minority interests). For example, higher concentra- 
tions of blacks in majority-minority districts could strengthen Republican 
prospects in neighboring districts and thus produce a Congress with more minori- 
ties but fewer total members that support policies that many minority represen- 
tatives promote. There are many studies that demonstrate some elements of a 
tradeoff between substantive representation of minority interests and descriptive 
representation (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Overby 
and Cosgrove 1996; Swain 1993; Thernstrom 1987; Whitby 1997, 132-33), 
although there may be some reasons to think that the immediate effects of any 
tradeoff might be limited or overstated (Bullock 1995, 155; Grofman and Handley 
1998, 61-62; and Whitby 1997, 132). 
However, where controversy and empirical work have emanated from ques- 
tions about what descriptive representation might deliver in terms of substantive 
policies for minorities, uncertainty surrounds questions about how an increase in 
representation might affect other aspects of the political system, namely trust, 
efficacy, and participation. While past research suggests that descriptive repre- 
sentation might not maximize the substantive interests of minority groups at the 
level of roll-call votes, increased minority representation might produce other 
effects that should be considered in any assessment of the potential tradeoffs 
between substantive and descriptive representation. Among these effects are what 
Mansbridge (1999, 642) identifies as the "communicative advantages" of descrip- 
tive representation. Without a descriptive representative, some constituents may 
face barriers communicating and identifying with their representative. In con- 
trast, the presence of a representative of the same race, ethnicity or gender can 
break down such barriers. Mansbridge (1999) cites as an example Fenno's por- 
trait of a black member's interactions with his constituents: "every expression he 
gives or gives off conveys the idea 'I am one of you' " (1978, 115; see also Swain 
1993, 219). Cain notes that the effects of majority-minority districting "must be 
weighted against the losses in system legitimacy and stability when minority 
voices are not well represented" (1992, 273). 
Along these lines, empowerment theory also suggests that descriptive repre- 
sentation has positive effects on minority citizens. Visible political leadership by 
members of a minority group should enhance trust in government, efficacy, group 
pride, and participation (see Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1991). Bobo 
and Gilliam (1990) suggest that minority citizens can become "empowered" after 
they have achieved significant descriptive representation and influence in politi- 
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cal decision making. Bobo and Gilliam reasoned that empowerment via descrip- 
tive representation should influence participation because the presence of minor- 
ity representatives creates macro-level cues that affect how people perceive the 
costs and benefits of voting (1990, 379). These contextual cues signal likely policy 
responsiveness "that encourages minorities to feel that participation has intrinsic 
value" (1990, 387). In other words, the presence of minority elected officials 
sends a contextual cue to minority citizens that the benefits of voting outweigh 
the costs of not voting. 
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) offer empirical evidence supporting their theory that 
minority empowerment is associated with greater participation. Conceptually and 
empirically they focused on the effects of blacks holding the mayor's office of 
large U.S. cities. Using a rare survey that oversampled blacks, they found that 
black citizens in cities having black local-elected officials were more likely to 
participate. Similar results have also been found by others. Howell and Fagan 
(1988) show that black citizens in New Orleans are much more trusting than 
African Americans in a national sample, and they attribute this difference to the 
presence of a black mayor. These attitudinal differences also extend to approval 
of minority representatives. Howell concludes that "black voters, because of their 
racial identification, are more likely to approve of the mayor regardless of their 
evaluations of general and specific city conditions" (2000, 69). Using aggregate 
data at the municipal level, black candidates appear to generate greater levels of 
political interest (Vanderleeuw and Utter 1993) and consequently higher turnout 
(Gilliam and Kaufman 1998) among African-Americans. However, the presence 
of black incumbents, as opposed to black candidates, is associated with lower 
turnout (Lublin and Tate 1995, 253). 
Very few studies have extended Bobo and Gilliam's thesis and findings to the 
national context. Brace et al. (1995) tested the empowerment thesis by examin- 
ing if minority-dominated congressional districts were associated with increased 
turnout. Their study was limited to two time periods (1988 and 1992) and uti- 
lized aggregate-level (precinct) data from Florida. Results were mixed, with evi- 
dence that turnout increased more over time in 46 predominantly black precincts 
that had moved from majority-white to majority-black congressional districts 
than it increased in 13 predominantly white precincts. However, they largely 
dismiss this effect, noting that it disappeared when controls for the presence of 
black candidates were introduced. The researchers did establish that a majority 
Hispanic congressional district was associated with a 10-12% increase in turnout, 
other things being equal (Brace et al. 1995, 199). These aggregate results, while 
suggestive, tell us little about how we might generalize beyond Florida,9 nor do 
they establish which citizens might be affected by the presence of a majority- 
'Florida is a difficult case from which to generalize, as it has some of the least competitive 
legislative districts in the world. In the 1992 general election, two newly created majority-minority 
(Hispanic) seats were uncontested. By the 1998 general election, 18 of 23 congressional districts were 
uncontested. 
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minority district. In a more recent study, Gay (2001) uses an ecological inference 
model to estimate black and white turnout rates for congressional districts with 
and without black representatives. She finds little evidence to suggest that the 
election of African Americans to Congress increases turnout among black 
citizens. 
In general, the shortage of research on the consequences of minority repre- 
sentation is unsettling since there is a rival hypothesis to the minority empower- 
ment thesis that suggests that methods to enhance minority representation 
through districting might actually depress turnout. For example in the United 
States, some observers suggest that because "safe" majority-minority districts 
would ensure minority representation, they might be associated with depressed 
turnout in the long run (Amy 1993; Guinier 1994). From this perspective, descrip- 
tive representation via majority-minority districts could thus lead to a downward 
spiral of minority engagement and participation. 
Minority Experience in New Zealand and the United States 
Although the focus of this paper is on electoral institutions that enhance the 
representation of previously underrepresented groups, the experiences of the 
under represented groups we study vary in important ways. Each group, Maori 
and African-Americans, is considered a "protected class"; however, Maori, as 
tangata whenua [original people of the land], are the victims of settler coloniza- 
tion while black Americans were brought to the United States as slaves and then 
suffered from segregation. Additionally, while black Americans suffered the ill 
effects of segregation, European settlers thought that, through intermarriage and 
cultural assimilation, Maori would become fully integrated with the settler pop- 
ulation. Maori lay claim to entitlements established under the Treaty of Waitangi, 
the document establishing British sovereignty over New Zealand signed in 1840.10 
Maori also have their own language that is recognized as one of the two official 
languages of New Zealand. While some Maori may not consider themselves as 
an ethnic minority, their subordination by colonial powers, subsequent special 
status, and proportion within the population has led to the institutionalization of 
the cultural differences and hence recognition as an ethnic minority (Linnekin 
and Poyer 1990, 12). 
Maori and black Americans do share a common experience as a disadvantaged 
group in society where the dominant cultural group is of West European descent. 
Social and economic disparities between Maori and New Zealand Europeans are 
comparable to those between black and white Americans. In terms of demo- 
graphics and socioeconomic status, the position of Maori in New Zealand is 
loIn signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, Maori exchanged their governance rights (according 
to the British Crown they exchanged their sovereignty) for the guarantees of the treaty (Orange 1987). 
The Treaty effectively established New Zealand as a British colony. The treaty is regarded by Maori 
as an affirmation of rights and a "sacred pact" with the ancestors of New Zealand. 
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remarkably similar to that of African Americans in the United States. Maori com- 
prise 14.5% of the population compared to 12.6% African American (Statistics 
New Zealand 1996; United States Bureau of the Census 1996). Like African 
Americans, Maori have lower income and education levels; have higher rates of 
unemployment, teenage pregnancy, and single-parent families; and are incarcer- 
ated at a rate that is disproportionate to their size of the population (see Sullivan 
1997, 364). In short, Maori are regarded as suffering the typical consequences of 
social disruption due to colonialism (Ritchie 1990). 
Maori also share with African Americans continuous support for a party to the 
left of center. As with African American's support for the Democratic party, Maori 
support for the left-of-center party in New Zealand originated during the depres- 
sion of the 1930s. The Labour Party was supportive of welfare reforms that equal- 
ized unemployment benefits between Maori and non-Maori and provided other 
benefits such as disability and old-age pension that were pushed by the Ratana 
movement, a religious and political movement that secured the Maori vote for 
the Labour party (see Sullivan and Vowles 1998). The alliance forged under the 
Labour government of the 1930s endured, and all Maori seats were held by the 
Labour party between 1943 and 1993. After growing disillusionment with Labour 
(Dalziel and Fox 1996), Maori turned to the populist New Zealand First party, 
headed by a Maori and former National party minister Winston Peters, in the 
1993 election. However, after a number of scandals New Zealand First Maori 
MPs lost the respect of Maori voters, and Maori voters returned in large numbers 
to the Labour party in the 1999 election (see Sullivan and Margaritis 2002). 
While Bobo and Gilliam (1990) specifically test minority empowerment in the 
case of black mayors in U.S. cities, there are reasons to expect that these argu- 
ments would apply in other cases where structures are in place to encourage rep- 
resentation among previously underrepresented groups (i.e., U.S. House districts 
and Maori electorates). Despite different experiences, the political and social and 
economic contexts of the indigenous population in New Zealand lead us to expect 
similar effects of descriptive representation on underrepresented groups in New 
Zealand and the United States. The historical roots of injustice may vary between 
the two countries, but there are important similarities between the two cases that 
make them useful cases for comparison. Group consciousness, socioeconomic 
inequalities and single party support since the depression are points of com- 
parison between the two groups. 
Expectations about the Effects of Minority Representation 
Based on the minority empowerment thesis, we would expect that minorities 
represented by minorities are more likely to feel trustful toward government, 
experience higher level of efficaciousness and exhibit higher levels of participa- 
tion than minorities with nonminority representatives. In the United States, blacks 
living in minority-majority districts then should score higher on these indicators 
than blacks outside these districts. If the empowerment thesis applies to the New 
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Zealand case, improvements in descriptive representation via the party list may 
be associated with a stronger level of attachment to the political system among 
all Maori, regardless of whether they choose to register on the Maori roll. 
However, if empowerment operates primarily through constituency representa- 
tion, then Maori choosing to be on the Maori roll should feel a greater sense of 
efficacy, and, possibly, a greater likelihood of participation than those Maori in 
general electorates. Given that the Maori electorates overlap with the general 
electorates, Maori who choose not to be on the Maori roll nevertheless reside in 
an area represented by a Maori electorate MP. However, they may be less likely 
to consider the Maori electorate MP as their own representative. In contrast, 
Maori on the roll will have voted in the contest to choose their own representa- 
tive, and, despite the advent of the party list vote in New Zealand, voters still 
maintain close ties to electorate MPs and the personal vote is important (Vowles 
et al. 1998). 
The rival hypothesis to minority empowerment is that descriptive representa- 
tion may lead to unintended and negative consequences. By being concentrated 
in districts that will automatically elect Maori representatives, Maori might actu- 
ally have less incentive to participate in electing their constituency representa- 
tives since Maori will be elected regardless of individual vote decisions. For 
similar reasons, blacks may have less incentive to participate in minority-major- 
ity districts. However, while the likelihood of electing a minority representative 
is increased, it is not guaranteed in these electorates as it is in the Maori elec- 
torates. Because the number of Maori seats is predetermined far more by enroll- 
ment than election-day decisions, the incentives to vote might be further 
dampened." 
Additionally, the positive effects of empowerment might be reduced given the 
fact that Maori have long had guaranteed representation through the Maori elec- 
torates. There is another reason to expect that minority empowerment might be 
more evident in the U.S. case than in New Zealand. In New Zealand, minority 
empowerment is achieved through registering on the Maori roll. In some ways, 
Maori not on this roll may be achieving the benefits of the Maori electorates, 
(descriptive representation), without paying the costs (e.g., less competitive 
districts). 
Testing Hypotheses about Minority Empowerment 
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) measure the effect of descriptive representation on 
a large set of factors that measure political activity, attitudes toward government 
and elected officials, political knowledge, and engagement in politics. We use 
similar indicators but divide them into two categories: district-based evaluations 
and activity (such as knowledge and approval of the representative and contact- 
"There may of course be other incentives to participate. Maori may be motivated to get a member 
of their own tribe or family or church into parliament. 
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ing the representative) and system-based evaluations and activity (such as polit- 
ical efficacy and voting). In the first case, the object of the evaluation or activity 
is the representative. The empowerment thesis posits that there will be a benefit 
to the constituent from racial or ethnic identity with his or her representative. 
Therefore, we expect that evaluations of the representative will be positively influ- 
enced by this identity. We also expect that identity with the representative will 
positively influence system-based activity and evaluations. 
Data and Methods 
Tests of the effect of minority empowerment on attitudes and turnout and 
models of minority participation have been constrained by data availability. Stan- 
dard random-sample surveys such as the American National Election Study 
(ANES) are not useful for examining the effects of variation in minority legisla- 
tive representation because there are few minority respondents, and even fewer 
who have minority representatives. We follow the approach of Bobo and Gilliam 
(1990) and Tate (1991), who used rare surveys that either oversampled the black 
population or were limited to blacks by relying on surveys that sampled blacks 
in the United States and Maori in New Zealand. The 1996 National Black Elec- 
tion Study (NBES) is based on telephone interviews of 1,216 voting eligible 
blacks completed before the 1996 Presidential election and 854 who were rein- 
terviewed after the election.'2 The survey was designed to explore the electoral 
attitudes and behavior of blacks and has an explicit congressional focus (see Tate 
1996, 2001). Respondents were matched to their congressional districts and asked 
to evaluate their House representatives. A total of 252 House districts are repre- 
sented in the sample, including the districts of 34 of the 39 black members of 
Congress. In all, 31% of the black respondents were represented by these black 
legislators. 
In New Zealand, a Maori survey was designed in conjunction with the New 
Zealand Election Study (NZES) to measure Maori political attitudes and behav- 
ior following the 1999 General Election. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with 1000 persons of Maori descent in December 1999 and January 2000 using 
a national multistage stratified probability sample with clustering.13 Maori 
respondents of voting age were selected regardless of enrollment status; thus, we 
can make comparisons between Maori enrolled on either the Maori or general 
rolls. The timing of both surveys takes full advantage of the increases in minor- 
12 The response rate for the preelection wave was 65%. 
13 A.C. Neilson (NZ) Ltd conducted the interviews on behalf of the NZES. Maori households were 
sampled from units that contained at least 5% Maori and respondents chosen randomly within the 
household. The sample is weighted by age and gender to reflect the Maori population. Personal inter- 
views were chosen because of the high rate of residential mobility among Maori, especially younger 
Maori, plus factors such as lower access to telephones, a tendency to live in larger households than 
the general population, and the culturally more acceptable practice of kanohi ki kanohi (face-to-face). 
The response rate was 54%. 
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ity representation that occurred in both countries in the 1990s. Together these 
data sets provide a unique opportunity to examine the impact of descriptive 
representation. Rarely do researchers have the opportunity to examine minority 
attitudes using a large sample in one country; two large samples of minority 
populations provide an uncommon opportunity to make comparisons both within 
and across countries. 
Our measures of district-based evaluations and activity are ability to recall the 
name of the representative, job approval of the representative, and contacting the 
representative. Two other indicators from the NBES ask respondents to recall any- 
thing special that the representative has done for the district and whether the rep- 
resentative is doing a good job keeping touch. Governmental responsiveness, trust 
in government, and interest served by government are used as indicators of 
system-based evaluations. Reported vote is used to indicate political participa- 
tion. There is great similarity across the two studies in terms of the questions. 
Questions are detailed in Table 1 and full question wording is given in an appen- 
dix available from the authors.'4 
Bivariate Results 
Table 1 is a first look at the potential effect of minority empowerment (via rep- 
resentation in the national legislature) on these indicators. These bivariate data 
reveal similar levels of awareness and contact with legislators among minorities 
in both the United States and New Zealand despite considerable differences in 
the number of persons represented in each district. Between 20 and 30% know 
the name of their representative and between 15 and 20% report having some 
contact with their representative or MP. In the United States, blacks are more 
likely to know the name of their representative when he or she is also black. Blacks 
are also more likely to report having contact with a black representative than with 
a representative who is not black. A similar relationship is evident in New Zealand 
but the differences are only slight. Overall, about 15% report having contact with 
their MP at some time over the past 12 months. Although not reported in the table, 
only a very small percentage of the Maori on the general roll (who are repre- 
sented by a non-Maori MP) reported having contact with the Maori electorate MP 
from their area. This provides support for our expectation that Maori who choose 
not to take the Maori option are more likely to consider their general electorate 
MP, and not the Maori electorate MP, as their representative. 
Larger differences are evident in evaluations of representatives and MPs. In 
the United States, 65% of blacks approve of their black representatives while only 
44% approve of representatives who are not black." Blacks are also more likely 
14 See http://www.banducci.com/articles/jop2004/. 
5 These are based on post election responses. In the preelection wave, there is a larger gap which 
is due to a lower approval of non minority representatives among blacks (36%). In comparison those 
represented by African American representatives were just as likely to approve of their performance 
in the preelection wave. 
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TABLE 1 
Effects of Minority Empowerment 
United States New Zealand 
Nonminority Minority Nonminority Minority 
Representative Representative Difference n Representative Representative Difference n 
Correctly recall name of representative 9.7 22.3 12.6** 1199 24.5 26.1 1.6 971 
Contact representative 8.3 13.6 5.3** 1199 13.0 15.9 2.9 970 
Recall anything special representative has 16.2 32.0 15.8** 662 na na 
done for district+ 
Representative job (very good) keeping in 17.6 34.0 16.4** 663 na na 
touch+ 
Approval of representative's performance 44.0 65.1 21.1** 838 31.4 21.9 -9.5** 907 
People like me have no say (% in agreement) 44.1 39.2 -4.9 838 63.0 55.8 -7.2a 958 
You can trust government most of the time 29.4 28.2 -1.2 837 34.4 34.3 -.1 971 
Government is run by big interests 66.5 70.4 3.9 836 64.6 65.4 .8 970 
Reported voting 73.6 79.3 5.7a 836 70.9 76.8 5.9* 970 
N 776 440 1216 461 509 970 
Source: National Black Election Study, 1996; New Zealand Maori Election Study, 1999. 
Note: First two questions in the Black Election Study were administered in the pre-election wave; all others were administered in the post-election. Reduced 
sample size is due to attrition. 
+Asked only of those who recognize representative's name. 
**p < .01; *p < .05. 
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to believe the representative is in touch and more likely to believe the represen- 
tative has done something special for the district when that representative is black. 
In New Zealand, Maori are more critical of their Maori MPs. Overall, just 22% 
approved of their Maori MPs while approval for non-Maori MPs was 31%. The 
low levels of approval for the Maori electorate MPs reflect in part their associa- 
tion with the New Zealand First party, whose electoral support dropped from 13% 
in 1996 to less than 5% in 1999.16 The party, which positioned itself in 1996 as 
a centrist party, held the balance of power after the 1996 election and subse- 
quently entered into a coalition with National whose policies were not compati- 
ble with traditional Maori issue positions (Sullivan 1997; Sullivan and Vowles 
1998). Halfway through the parliamentary term, the coalition government col- 
lapsed, and all of the Maori electorate MPs defected from their party to support 
a National minority government. 
While these results so far suggest that evaluations of minority representatives 
differ across countries, feelings of responsiveness and participation are more con- 
sistent. In New Zealand, Maori appear to have greater feelings of powerlessness 
than blacks. However, in both countries, slightly fewer believe they have no say 
when they have a minority representative. On the measures that tap more diffuse 
attitudes toward government, we find striking similarities across countries. About 
two-thirds of blacks and Maori believe that their country is run by big interests 
and just a third believe that government can be trusted most of the time. There 
are, however, few differences within countries indicating that descriptive repre- 
sentation does not matter with respect to these attitudes. These results are con- 
sistent with Bobo and Gilliam (1990, 383) who find that "local" empowerment 
did not change trust in the federal government or improve blacks' views of the 
motivations of politicians in general. However, the results in Table 1 do suggest 
that empowerment mobilizes voters. Although participation rates vary across 
countries, both blacks and Maori appear to be more likely to vote when they are 
represented by a minority. 
The Effects of Minority Empowerment: Multivariate Models 
In Tables 2 and 3 we model the effect of minority empowerment on recall, 
contact, approval, efficacy, and voting when controlling for other factors. Keeping 
in touch and doing something special have been dropped from the multivariate 
analysis due to their absence from the New Zealand data set. Because there were 
no significant differences in the bivariate analysis, we do not include trust in gov- 
ernment and government run by big interests." In addition to the term reflecting 
16Although New Zealand First failed to cross the 5% threshold it still managed to retain parlia- 
mentary representation because its leader, Winston Peters, managed to retain his electorate seat by a 
slim margin of 67 votes. 
17 Because a significant relationship could be suppressed by another factor, we estimated a model 
with trust and big interests as dependent variables. However, the multivariate analysis did not produce 
any significant differences between those with and those without a minority representative. 
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TABLE 2 
Impact of Empowerment: United States 
Logit Approve of 
Coefficients Recall Name of Contact Representative's People Like Me 
Variables Representative Representative Performance Have a Say Reported Voting 
Minority Representative 1.03** (.23) .49* (.25) .62** (.16) -.02 (.15) .03 (.22) 
Education 3.02** (.50) 1.93** (.54) .41 (.37) .07 (.36) 3.27** (.60) 
Identify w/same party as Rep .69** (.20) .38 (.22) .86** (.14) -.06 (.14) .47* (.19) 
Female -.67** (.19) -.17 (.21) -.29* (.14) -.13 (.14) .35 (.18) 
Age (in 10s) .19** (.06) .17* (.07) .11* (.04) -.08 (.04) .38** (.07) 
Income .65 (.44) 1.79** (.49) .44 (.31) .47 (.30) .34 (.43) 
Economy 1.20** (.38) .53 (.42) -.18 (.26) .96** (.26) .64 (.35) 
Attend religious service -.03 (.43) .57 (.48) 1.00** (.30) 1.23** (.29) .47 (.40) 
Urban residence -.51" (.24) -.39 (.26) -.15 (.16) .24 (.16) .23 (.22) 
South -.53 (.28) -.44 (.31) -.08 (.17) .26 (.17) .40 (.24) 
Constant 1 -5.37** (.54) -5.50** (.60) -.65 (.35) -.16 (.34) -3.25** (.50) 
Constant 2 .02 (.35) 1.06** (.34) 
Constant 3 1.60** (.35) 1.16** (.34) 
Constant 4 2.46** (.35) 2.30** (.35) 
Pseudo R2 .22 .12 .12 .06 .19 
N 1208 1208 832 832 854 
**p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test). 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3 
Impact of Empowerment: New Zealand 
Approve of 
Logit Coefficients Recall Name of Contact Representative's People Like Me 
Variables Representative Representative Performance Have a Say Reported Voting 
Minority Representative .17 (.17) .24 (.20) -.56** (.14) .28* (.13) .44* (.17) 
Education 2.05** (.44) 2.75** (.53) .30 (.36) 1.47* (.34) 2.37** (.48) 
Identify w/same party as Rep .10 (.21) -.08 (.27) -.17 (.17) .01 (.16) .05 (.21) 
Female -.22 (.16) .17 (.19) -.14 (.13) -.26* (.12) .26 (.16) 
Age (in 10s) .37** (.06) .21** (.07) .01 (.05) -.06 (.04) .55** (.07) 
Income 2.03** (.39) .66 (.46) -.45 (.34) .29 (.31) .84 (.44) 
Economy -.29 (.42) -.25 (.50) .43 (.35) 1.53** (.33) .50 (.43) 
Attend religious service -.22 (.18) -.11 (.21) -.39* (.15) .08 (.13) -.23 (.18) 
Tribal residence .70** (.17) .48* (.20) .12 (.14) .12 (.13) .17 (.18) 
Constant 1 -4.47** (.49) -4.76 (.57) -2.78** (.40) -.21 (.35) -3.14** (.51) 
Constant 2 -1.69** (.39) 2.10** (.36) 
Constant 3 .95* (.39) 2.77** (.36) 
Constant 4 2.81** (.41) 5.75** (.43) 
Pseudo R2 .18 .09 .04 .07 .17 
N 966 966 904 967 966 
**p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test). 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 




This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:15:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation 549 
the race or ethnicity of the representative (minority rep), another measure of rep- 
resentation is included that controls for whether a citizen is represented by a party 
with which they identify (Identify w/party of rep.). We assume that individuals 
who are represented by someone of the same party will have more positive views 
about politics and governmental responsiveness. Our models also control for the 
effects of factors expected to influence attitudes about government, including 
level of education, gender, age, income, evaluations of the economy, and place 
of residence. These are labeled, respectively, Education, Female, Age, Income, 
Economy, and Urban residence or Tribal residence (full coding is available from 
the authors). We have also included an indicator of religiosity in the model 
(Attend religious service).'5 Church attendance has been found to be an impor- 
tant mobilizing factor for black Americans (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001). 
We might also expect that church attendance among Maori acts as a source of 
psychological and social attachment o the community and fosters greater turnout. 
We also include a dummy variable for Southerners (in the U.S. model). To ease 
the interpretation of the coefficients and assess their relative impact, all inde- 
pendent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All dependent variables are 
constructed such that higher values indicate more positive evaluations or atti- 
tudes. Since the dependent variables are either dichotomous or ordered responses 
to survey questions, models are estimated with logit. 
Results 
Table 2 reports the results for the United States. The effect of minority repre- 
sentative is more prominent for the district-based evaluations and activity than 
for the system-based evaluations and activity. The effects of minority empower- 
ment are significant and in the expected direction on recall, contact, and approval. 
Even when controlling for party identification, blacks are more likely to recall 
the name of their representative, more likely to contact the representative, and 
approve of his or her performance. As the probabilities displayed in Table 4 show, 
the likelihood of recalling the name of a minority representative is more than 
twice as high (.21) as recalling the name of a representative who is not black 
(.09). While the likelihood of contacting a representative who is black remains 
relatively low, it is nonetheless slightly higher than for a representative who is 
not black. Moreover, blacks are far more likely to approve of their representative 
when he or she is also black (.61) than when he or she is not (.46). However, with 
regard to efficacy and political participation, minority representation appears to 
have no significant impact. 
When comparing the effect of minority representation to same party repre- 
sentation, we see that policy congruence matters in name recall and approval 
18In New Zealand, 71% reported not attending Church at all compared to just 5% in the United 
States. Therefore, in New Zealand whether or not a respondent reported attending Church is used 
while the frequency of attendance is taken into account in the United States. 
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TABLE 4 
Estimated Probabilities 
United States New Zealand 
Nonminority Minority Nonminority Minority 
Representative Representative Representative Representative 
Correctly recall name .09 .21 .21 .24 
of representative 
Contact representative .08 .12 .12 .14 
Approval of representative's .46 .61 .31 .21 
performance 
People like me have no say .55 .55 .06 .08 
(likelihood of disagreement) 
Reported voting .76 .76 .73 .81 
Note: Estimates are derived from Tables 2 and 3 holding all other variables constant at their means. 
of the representative. However, unlike minority representation, identifying with 
the same party as the representative did not influence contact with the represen- 
tative. Also, the size of the coefficient for Identify w/party of rep indicates that 
it has less of an impact on recall and contact than minority rep. As for approval, 
both measures have a similar influence. Religious attendance, on the other hand, 
influences approval and responsiveness, but does not have much influence on 
voting.19 
The results for New Zealand are presented in Table 3. Unlike the United States, 
the effect of minority representation is more prominent on the system-based eval- 
uations and activity than district-based evaluations. The ethnicity of the MP does 
not appear to matter for recall or contact but it does have an influence on respon- 
siveness. Maori who choose to be represented by Maori electorate MPs are more 
likely to believe that they have a say than those represented by electorate MPs 
who are not Maori. Although the likelihood of feeling efficacious is small for 
Maori regardless of enrollment status (see Table 4), the likelihood of having the 
lowest level of efficacy is higher for Maori on the general roll (.45) than those on 
the Maori roll (.38).20 This suggests that the Maori electorates succeed in foster- 
ing a greater sense of efficacy among those Maori who choose to take advantage 
of the Maori option. Maori, however, are more critical of their Maori MPs than 
those on the general roll. Nevertheless, minority empowerment appears to lead 
19While these results are inconsistent with Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh (2001), they are consis- 
tent with Calhoun-Brown (1996) who uses the NBES and finds that church attendance does not make 
a difference for black political participation, though membership in a political church does. 
20 Because the variable has five categories, the probability of falling into any one category differs. 
The largest differences occur across the categories of agreement, rather than disagreement, which 
probably reflects the way in which the question was asked. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:15:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation 551 
to greater participation. Those on the Maori roll have a probability of voting of 
.81 as compared to .73 for those who are on the general roll. 
In neither the United States or the New Zealand case is economic performance 
a significant predictor of representative approval though more positive assess- 
ments enhances the degree to which both blacks and Maori believe they have a 
say in what government does. While education has the largest impact on voting 
in both countries, with nearly identical effects, the impact of ethnicity on turnout 
is greater in New Zealand than the effect of race in the United States. Unlike the 
United States, partisan effects are not significant in any of the models indicating 
that those who identified with the same party as their representative were no more 
or less affected than those identifying with other parties regardless of minority 
representation. This suggests that the partisanship of the representative or MP is 
more likely to make a difference for minority citizens in the United States than 
in New Zealand.21 
While not a factor in the United States, self-selection may explain some of the 
differences observed in New Zealand. Persons choosing to register on the Maori 
roll may be motivated by several factors that distinguish them from their coun- 
terparts on the general roll. One incentive for choosing to remain on the Maori 
roll is to further the representation of Maori since the number of Maori seats are 
determined by enrollment. Maori activists who opt for the Maori roll to further 
their representation may be highly educated and engaged in the political process. 
Others, however, may choose the Maori option if they are disenchanted or alien- 
ated from the political system. For them, the Maori option may serve as a means 
of registering protest. An analysis of the data suggests that none of these factors 
influences the decision to take the Maori option. Those opting to register on the 
Maori roll did not significantly differ on any sociodemographic characteristics 
with one exception. Those with lower incomes were more likely to be on the 
Maori roll. Greater political interest is also evident among Maori who are on the 
Maori roll.22 To determine whether this influenced the results in Table 3, we esti- 
mated another model controlling for political interest. While the coefficient for 
minority rep was slightly reduced, the results remained statistically significant. 
Overall these findings point to the conclusion that the results observed in Table 
2 are not likely to be the result of self-selection. 
Conclusions 
Many of these results are consistent with expectations derived from the minor- 
ity empowerment thesis. In the United States, the race of the representative influ- 
21 African Americans appear to have much stronger levels of partisanship than Maori; specifically 
almost half (47.5%) of African Americans strongly identify with a party as compared to just 22% for 
Maori. The lower levels of partisanship among Maori almost certainly reflect disillusionment with 
the Labour party in the 1980s and early 1990s and New Zealand First in the late 1990s. 
22 While this may be due to self-selection, we cannot rule out the possibility that being on the Maori 
roll enhances political interest, which would still be consistent with the minority empowerment thesis. 
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ences recall, contact, and approval. In New Zealand, Maori who are represented 
by Maori electorate MPs are more likely to believe they have a say in govern- 
ment but are also more critical of their MPs. In New Zealand, Maori are also 
more likely to vote when their representative is also of Maori descent. While 
descriptive representation matters in different ways, the evidence from both coun- 
tries leads one to conclude that the effects of descriptive representation are gen- 
erally positive. 
These results complicate a discussion of the potential tradeoff between descrip- 
tive and substantive representation. They illustrate that enhanced descriptive rep- 
resentation of minorities might produce normative gains that are removed from 
issues of whether such practices as minority-majority districts accomplish or 
harm the substantive representation of minorities. Our findings illustrate some of 
the legitimacy gains associated with minority voices being represented in the U.S. 
Congress and the N.Z. House of Representatives. If we desire electoral practices 
that strengthen representational links and encourage participation, then the use 
of special districts that enhance descriptive representation appear to yield some 
modest but valuable returns. We suspect that many electoral practices could 
produce similar effects if they empower minorities by enhancing their prospects 
for representation (e.g., PR, cumulative voting, limited voting, etc.). But we must 
also consider that the nature of single-member districts might enhance the link 
between representative and constituent (see Farrell 2001) and that minority 
empowerment is more likely to be achieved under electoral systems that maxi- 
mize this link. 
The relationship between minority representation and voter turnout further 
complicates the issue of a tradeoff. We have shown that minority representation 
increases the likelihood that minority citizens will vote in those places where 
minorities hold office (see the bivariate results in the United States and the mul- 
tivariate results in New Zealand). However, it is difficult to conjecture about the 
aggregate effect that minority empowerment has on turnout.23 For example, in the 
United States, aggregate turnout in districts with black representation might be 
lower because of a reduced likelihood that whites will vote (see Gay 2001). This 
negative effect suggests that, although minority populations may be more likely 
to vote, there is no guarantee that overall turnout will increase when districts are 
drawn to facilitate the election of minority representatives. It is possible in the 
United States, however, that turnout effects could operate on elections for 
governor, senator, and president. A number of statewide contests in states with 
majority-minority black districts were decided by margins of less than 1% in the 
1990s.24 Small changes in turnout generated from within one or two minority- 
23 Establishing such aggregate-level effects are beyond the scope of this paper. 
24Examples include the 1996 LA senate race, won by 5,788 votes; the 1994 AL and SC and 1999 
MS governor races, and the 1996 GA senate race. In the 1990s, four Democratic senators from states 
with majority-minority districts were elected with margins of less than 3% (Landrieu LA, Cleland 
GA, Hollings SC, and Feinstein CA). 
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represented districts could swing extremely close statewide races toward Demo- 
cratic candidates, and thus possibly enhance the substantive representation of 
black interests. In New Zealand's mixed system, increases in turnout that are 
linked to minority representatives in the single-member district may also spill 
over to the party vote. Because we cannot be certain of the impact that increased 
minority turnout has on the policy positions of elected representatives, it is 
unclear whether the net effect of any differences in turnout rates inside majority- 
minority House districts or Maori electorates leads necessarily to changes in the 
substantive representation of minorities. 
It is important to note that we cannot establish how sustained these effects 
on efficacy, trust, and turnout may be. In both cases, we have relied on data that 
is a snapshot of one election that for idiosyncratic reasons may explain some 
of the differences. As Tate (1991) suggest, once minority representation is 
achieved interest and, thus, turnout decline. At the same time, it is also reason- 
able to expect that minority citizens affected by descriptive representation may 
become socialized into the habit of voting more frequently, particularly if their 
attitudes about governmental responsiveness become more positive. In the United 
States, the more recent majority-minority districts may have worked to spark 
interest in the election and turnout. Increases in Maori representation through an 
increase in the number of Maori seats and through PR may have enhanced the 
awareness of descriptive representation. Yet as our results show, the effects of 
increased representation were more likely to be felt by those represented by Maori 
electorate MPs. What remains unclear is whether or not the difference we see 
will persist. Long-term panel studies of minorities are required to investigate such 
questions. 
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